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NYU JOURNAL OF
LAw & LIBERTY

INTUITION, CUSTOM, AND
PROTOCOL:
HOW TO MAKE SOUND DECISIONS
WITH LIMITED KNOWLEDGE
Richard A. Epstein
It is my very great pleasure to be asked on this occasion to
deliver the first Friedrich von Hayek lecture at the New York
University School of Law. One need look no further than NYU's
new Journal of Law & Liberty to have some sense of the enduring
influence that Hayek has had on the intellectual temper of modern
times. It is no mean feat for a native Austrian to migrate to England
and then to the United States, while composing along the way some
of the most influential works of the twentieth century. Like so many
individuals of enduring greatness, Hayek defied the usual
conventions that separate one academic discipline from another.
Trained as an economist, he gravitated away from technical subjects
to the more ethereal realm of political theory. Moreover, his work in
this area was tempered by a real appreciation for the power of legal
institutions to shape human behavior. A cross between the
economist, the philosopher, and the lawyer, he addressed a wide
range of issues that escaped writers who were tightly bound to a
single discipline. He is generally regarded as the single most
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important figure in the revival of classical liberalism in the
twentieth century.'
All the more remarkable, he did his best work by writing
against the grain. At a time when central planning was regarded as
the solution to the ills of a chaotic and disorganized market
economy, Hayek marshaled his intellectual firepower to explain
that the failures of central planning were not unfortunate lapses
that could be cured by a more careful application of the socialist
program. 2 He showed that the inability of any one person or bureau
to assemble all information about everyone's (indeed anyone's)
needs and desires doomed any system that relied primarily on the
centralized distribution of goods and services to satisfy the full
range of human needs.
I think his vindication on this frontier marks the most
positive portion of the Hayekian legacy, and it is surely enough for
one lifetime. But the great political successes should not be allowed
to conceal the other side of the story. If socialism is wrong, then
how do we find out what kind of system should be put into place?
How do we figure out what social norms should be, and how do we
decide which of these-all, some, or none-should be converted
into legal norms? In dealing with this question, Hayek showed
great disdain for what he termed the "constructivist" fallacy, by
which he meant the idea that scholars outside the social system are
able to generate a grand theory that unifies all of social experience
under a single tent. 3 Hayek was deeply suspicious of anyone's effort
to formulate overarching principles that explained social life.

1 For a

full collection of his works, see The FriedrichHayek Scholars' Page,

http://www.hayekcenter.org/friedrichhayek/hayek.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
2 F. A. Hayek, Socialist Calculation:The Competitive 'Solution,' 7 ECONOMICA 125 (1940);
F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). The
objects of his criticism were OSKAR LANGE & FRED M. TAYLOR, ON THE ECONOMIC

THEORY OF SOCIALISM (Benjamin E. Lippincott ed., 1938) and HENRY D. DICKINSON,
ECONOMICS OF SOCIALISM (1939); and, somewhat later, BARBARA WOOTTON, FREEDOM
UNDER PLANNING (1945).
3 1 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 27 (1973).
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Neither a libertarian nor utilitarian be was in one sense the guiding
principle of his work.
Yet what is put in the place of the two political philosophies
that, for all their failings, have done enormous amounts of good in
organizing and taming social behavior? Hayek took refuge in what
could be termed a theory of social evolution. He believed we come
to a form of "spontaneous order" that leads us to the right social
answers through the accumulation of a large number of trial and
error decisions made by individuals on the ground. His major
illustration was his (oversimplified) account of how the law
merchant evolved over time and across cultures independent of
formal legal intervention: it is for that reason that he chose the title
"Reason and Evolution" for the first chapter of Law, Legislation and
Liberty.4 The law merchant (which he did not fully understand) was
treated as an outgrowth of this spontaneous process and strong
evidence of the evolution of legal norms prior to the intervention of
the state. 5 Even on this point, he overstated the extent of
decentralized development relative to judicial pronouncement, but
the challenges that the law merchant poses to the usual dichotomy
between positive and natural law is not the main focus of this talk.
Rather my concerns travel along a different path. To what extent
does this system of spontaneous order, achieved by evolutionary
change, give a sensible account of legal and social institutions?
In order to attack that question, I would like to examine the
three sorts of devices that could be used to set up rules and
procedures under which individual and collective choices are made.
Mv main focus is on the processes by which knowledge is acquired,
which then leads to the further question of what legal rules best
harness the knowledge so acquired. In answering this inquiry I do

4 Id. at 8.
5 For a recent symposium on this subject see Symposium,

The Empirical and
Theoretical Underpinnings of the Law Merchant, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1 (2004) My
contribution is Richard A. Epstein, Reflections on the Historical Origins and Economic
Structure of the Law Merchant, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1 (2004).
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not think that we can come up with a univocal source for all
decisions, so I will then distinguish three related ways of looking at
knowledge: intuition, custom, and protocol.
To set the stage, let me adopt a form of indirect
utilitarianism (which Hayek was loath to do) that helps us examine
these methods of knowledge. One common view of utilitarianism is
that it seeks to maximize net social benefits over social costs. Often
utilitarian theorists take less care than they ought on the question of
whose benefit or whose cost. But since in this context we are talking
about broad rules of constant application, the distributional issue
tends to drop out of the equation. All gains and losses are roughly
proportional for individuals that operate behind some Rawlsian veil
of ignorance (which is why that metaphor offers such a powerful
heuristic). But the great insight is that the rules that work best by
utilitarian standards do not have to be couched in utilitarian terms;
nor do they have to be motivated by a conviction that they will
maximize the greatest good of the greatest number. Rather, in many
cases, these desirable social ends are best achieved by responses
done for independent reasons at the micro level that generate
beneficial results at the macro level. But by the same token, the path
of aggregation is sufficiently perilous that we have to be cautious
that these multiple processes will achieve that result.
So what key insight drives this form of indirect
utilitarianism? I think that much of what is at stake here is captured
in flawed but instructive form by Malcolm Gladwell's recent book
Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking,6 whose major theme is
that we are able to make accurate decisions, often in the blink of an
eye, by systematically filtering out information that looks to be
relevant but in fact generates more trouble than it is worth.
Gladwell's basic insight is that we have limited capacities and are
better off concentrating on key features that are capable of quick
assessment than running on at great length, seeking to juggle lots of

6 MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING (2005).
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different observations into some grand whole. Although Gladwell
never draws the connection, it should be obvious that his thesis is
much like the Hayekian norm in which social evolution generates a
spontaneous order without central planning.
The difficulty with this thesis, I think, is that it fails to
observe the differences in the three terms that I placed in series in
the title of the lecture: intuition, custom, and protocol. All of these
embody the basic proposition that less is more in decision theory as
in architecture. But they do so in different ways. No single
approach that confuses each device with the other will do the job.
Intuition
The first of these elements is ordinary human intuition,
which in many instances has played a powerful role in social
theory. I will pass by any detailed discussion of the theory of selfevidence as it worked its way into the Declaration of Independence
and note that the first half of the twentieth century witnessed the
result of a strong theory of ethical intuitionism, associated with G.E.
Moore 7 and W.D. Ross, 8 by which individuals were said to have
certain "prima facie rights," chiefly to bodily integrity and the
enforcement of promises. Modern utilitarians like to deride this
low-tech theory and prefer to explain the emergence of these rules
as an effective means to secure and promote social well-being. But
the rational reconstruction does not explain clearly why these more
primitive norms have such a powerful draw on the minds of
ordinary people, most of whom find their quest for moral guidance
frustrated by the more learned utilitarian reformulation. This point
was brought home to me by an incident some years ago at a Liberty
Fund Conference, where at lunch I waxed on about some functional
explanation for a given social rule - it matters not which. My
interlocutor was an English professor from Wofford College who
confessed that he did not follow the fine points of the argument. But

7 See generally G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETICA (1903).
8 See generally W.D. ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (1930).
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he said with complete confidence that he thought that a videotape
of our conversation would allow him to secure my civil
commitment in any state in the union. The jargon about social
optimality fell on deaf ears.
It turns out, or so my friends in psychology say, that there
is some reason to believe that most people exhibit a tone-deaf
response to moral arguments that rely explicitly on generalized
conceptions of social welfare. In this context I rely on an instructive
review article by Jonathan Haidt.9 Individuals have to make
decisions all the time, and they could not wait for the formulation of
expected utility theory to get on with the business of their lives in
caves and other prehistoric conditions. They had huge numbers of
interactions that they had to process, and they would not succeed in
their own productive labor if they had to calculate expected utilities
for each activity undertaken. So they had to develop and internalize
some quick rules of thumb that would give them a leg up in the
business of life. Perfection and refinement is not the goal in such a
system. Passable reliability, better than random outcomes, is all that
can be expected. If the psychologists are to be believed, ordinary
people are hard-wired, so that they have strong predispositions that
allow them not only to judge others, but also to restrain themselves.
The natural lawyers took this same basic view of human behavior.
Some of these thinkers clothed the natural set of dispositions in
their divine origins and took the position that the utility of man's
basic nature was evidence of the benevolence of divine creation. But
that religious orientation was not part of the original Roman view
on the subject, which was much more naturalistic in origin.10 The
basic model was that cooperative human behavior could not
emerge in any social regime unless individuals had some bulwark
against the relentless forces of Hobbesian self-interest. Any
9 Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach
to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCH. REV. 814 (2001). For my take on its implications for
state of nature theory, see Richard A. Epstein, The Theory and Practiceof Self-Help, 1 J.
L., ECON. & POL'Y 1 (2005).
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successful barrier against aggressive impulses could not depend on
conscious decisions to adopt honorable behavior. Any such
decisions could not withstand the temptation to which human
beings are routinely subject. Basic behaviors have to be internalized,
almost as a matter of stimulus and response, driven by deep
hormonal instincts." It was of course in tension with naked selfinterest, and at times it would yield to desire. But that inborn
instinct also allows individuals, chiefly through gossip, to articulate
the relevant norms of behavior as they evaluate disputes that arise
within their circle of friends and acquaintances. The social context is
strong enough that they have to be able to persuade other
individuals to go along with them. The relevant norms here do not
kick in with the power of autonomic reactions, such as breathing,
but their responses are highly structured nonetheless. The word
"visceral" is a literal term in describing reactions to certain forms of
improper conduct. Do it this way and you will have a knot in your
gut, a pang of conscience, or whatever.
Just what were the dominant norms in cases of this sort?
Jonathan Haidt summarizes them as follows. There is a norm of
reciprocity, a norm of nonaggression, and a norm against disgust.
These norms are not just philosophical abstractions, but are
concrete guides to behavior as well. 2 For example, individuals who
adopt the norm of reciprocity have to show trust toward other
individuals. Similarly they have to be able to figure out, often in the
blink of an eye, whether other people are worthy of their trust.
Likewise, they learn to detect, and hence to avoid, individuals who
exhibit aggressive or, broadly conceived, socially destructive
10 See JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES, bk. 1, tit. I (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans., Cornell
Univ. Press 1987) (533).
11 For a popular summary of modern research, see Robert Lee Hotz, Anatomy of Give
and Take, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2005, at Al, describing experiments on trust in which
the participants could not bring themselves to cheat on cooperation in the final
round although it was in their narrow self-interest to do so.
12 See generally Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Knowing Thyself. The Evolutionary
Psychology of Moral Reasoning and Moral Sentiments, in 4 BUSINESS, SCIENCE, AND
ETHICS 91 (2004).
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behavior. Stated more generally, individuals are in general drawn
to others who do not violate these particular norms, which helped
to establish the norms in small communities that had only the
weakest centralized institutions associated with the Austinian
vision of law as the command of the sovereign.
And how should we interpret these norms? As the
foundation of much of the common law system of basic
entitlements. It does not take a legal genius to see how the
nonaggression principle morphs into the law of tort; how the
reciprocity principle, down even to the doctrine of consideration,
morphs into the law of contract; and how the norm against disgust
evolves into the system of social prohibitions against various sexual
and bodily practices, which bore a close relationship to procreation,
on the one hand, and sexually transmitted diseases on the other.
There is little doubt in my mind that the nineteenth century
political synthesis embraced all these norms, for the police power,
as it was generally termed, made it clear that the state could
regulate liberty (of contract) and property in the name of morals, a
position that held firm until its reversal in the twentieth century
and its revival in the twenty first 13 with the succession of states that
have enacted bans of gay marriage. These norms have real clout
and they fit into the system of strong intuitions. Let yourself
imagine a situation in which there is a violation of one or another of
these norms, and your hard-wires send off all sorts of alarms. The
system of prima facie rights has a tight normative connection to the
psychological underpinnings of human behavior.
And it is just here that some of the shortfalls of intuitionism
assert themselves. The two most important have a close relationship
13 For the traditional account, see ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER (1904). For
discussion, see WILLIAM NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996). For the modem view that gave sexual

relationships the preferred position of "intimate associations," see Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), overruling
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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with each other. The first of these asks this simple question: if we
use the term "prima facie right" to account for these intuitive
relationships, how then do we flesh out the rest of the picture?
There are two difficulties here, each of which has been faced by
every legal system from the Roman law to the present. 14 The first
concerns the coverage of the basic prohibitions. Here are two
obvious examples: does the prohibition against killing also extend
to cases where someone lays traps for his victim, or sets poison in
front of him? It seems clear to anyone who reflects about the issue
that the original prohibition will lose much of its bite if these easy
circumventions work. So the holes have to be plugged. But the
question is, how far can one move from the original case before the
analogies looked strained?
The second difficulty is every bit as great. One reason why
we call the rights protected by these prohibitions prima facie rights
is that on reflection it is clear that they are stated too broadly. All
killings are not regarded as wrongful; some could be justified or
excused by insanity or self-defense. And, therefore, any system has
to ask how these corrections are worked into the basic pattern
without undermining the force of the original prohibition
altogether. Put these two points together and you have a
hermeneutical project that required centuries of arduous labor to
complete. But it is not just a coincidence that the inclination to
undertake that kind of close examination of both text and structure
is more a characteristic of ancient legal systems than of modern
ones. They have fewer structural questions -infrastructure,
interoperability, taxation-to worry about than we do. The
corrective justice arguments that work so well in dealing with oneon-one cases often fall short when dealing with today's provision of
public goods and organization of network industries.

14 For the Roman approach, see the discussion of the Lex Aquilia in 1 JUSTINIAN,

DIGEST, bk. IX, tit. 2,(Alan Watson ed. & trans., Univ. of Penn. Press 1998) (533); for
my analysis, see generally Richard A. Epstein, A Common Lawyer Looks at
ConstitutionalInterpretation,72 B.U. L. REV. 699 (1992).
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Without question, the classical scholars did a superb job in
executing their long-standing program of correcting and refining
these basic moral intuitions. Anyone who teaches ancient legal
subjects, as I do, is always impressed with the deft treatment of
particular cases, and the slow and orderly development of the law.
For example, the basic classifications in such areas as bailments or
finders developed by the classical lawyers remain the accepted
rules today. Modern scholars have little desire to undo the results of
these earlier efforts. Yet at the same time, there is, in general, a deep
suspicion that the classical lawyers did not supply a justificatory
apparatus equal to its assigned task. At every critical juncture in the
argument, we are told that natural reason or natural justice is the
explanation for the decision at hand. 15 There is a clear sense in
which these terms are intended to evoke some connection between
the basic personality and temperament that nature endows in all
human beings, for the biological element is certainly prominent in
much of this early thought. Yet at the same time, there is little effort
to explain how the preferred legal rules discharge their appropriate
social function. The modern task of reinterpreting ancient legal
rules is usually meant to supply, in anti-Hayekian style, some
functional reason why the individual who takes first possession of
some natural object becomes its owner. The various efforts to
defend this rule sound very tinny all the way through Adam Smith,
who envisioned the implied consent of mankind as the glue that
holds us all together. 16 The effort failed because it takes categories
that do have relevance -consent is a powerful source of contractual
obligations -and uses them in a somewhat fictional sense to cover
situations where consent is in principle needed but in practice not
available.
The modern notion of social improvement, in the Paretian
sense of the term, really took much longer to emerge, and was not
clear until the late nineteenth or even mid-twentieth century. Once
15 See, e.g., JUSTINIAN, supra note 10.
16 See ADAM SMITH, Of Occupation, in LECrURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 14 (R.L. Meek et

al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1766).
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developed, it then tended to reinforce the old rules in many of their
key applications. At this point if we look back at our three
fundamental norms, the first two have fairly clear content, but the
last one is much more complex. The prohibition against aggression
is meant to cut out those negative sum games; that is, those in
which the gains on the one side are not large enough to compensate
for the losses on the other. Stopping these cases is critical because
there is no cure, no magic offset, in large numbers. The more these
destructive cycles take place, the greater the cumulative losses. If A
kills B, the situation is not set aright if C kills D by way of
vengeance, inviting further retaliation. The utilitarian justifications
for that prohibition are so strong under every conceivable variation
of the theory that the legal rules and their endless refinements show
little movement in the last 2,000 or so years. Even rule adaptations
that are attributable to technical innovations -death by laser beam
or nuclear attack-are analyzed under the traditional framework.
The advantage of the utilitarian approach is that it gives some help
in figuring out the various exceptions and how they should be
interpreted. Self-defense, or the threat thereof, is a way to reduce
the initial incidence of aggression. But it is itself subject to sufficient
abuse that the terms and conditions under which it is allowed are
heavily circumscribed, just as the traditional law had it.
Parallel problems of explication also arise with respect to
the obligations of reciprocity. The attractiveness of that norm lies in
the win/win situations that it produces. The difficulty with the
norm lies in the two major adjustments needed to translate that
intuition into a desirable social state. The first of these addresses the
defects in the process of contract formation. If that is defective, then
it undermines our confidence that the win/win condition will hold.
The second relates to possible negative external effects that can
dwarf the private gain to the contracting parties. This last point is
worthy of at least one brief elaboration. Contracts magnify the ability
of individuals to do what they want: after all, gains from trade just
mean that the combined efforts of two individuals yield an outcome
that is greater than the sum of their individual efforts. So, if the
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negative effects of certain conduct (e.g. murder) are large, then the
contracts in service of that end will produce mutual gains to the
transacting parties that will, regrettably, generate high social losses
as well. Increasing the private gain simultaneously increases the
social loss. For those contracts, we have negative words:
combinations, conspiracies, trafficking, aiding, abetting, and the
like. But notwithstanding these difficulties, the classical synthesis,
which relied on working out the implications of the early intuitions,
stands us in good stead today.
The last intuition on morals and distaste is in fact the
hardest to harmonize with more modern functional norms. The fear
of contagion, the inability to determine parentage, and the like did
pose a serious threat to social organizations. Hence, there are a
powerful set of taboos that grow up around some practices. Those
taboos resonate powerfully today with some people, as with redstate opposition to gay marriage. But there is a second point of view
which takes a more libertarian view of matters, and insists that all
cases in this third category should be decomposed into cases that
fall into either of the first two categories, so that gay marriage
becomes in modern times a protected win/win transaction instead
of an "offense against nature," which is the instructive early term.
So intuition ends up as a guide through this moral thicket, useful
but limited. And in modern thought it is more likely to be displaced
as two features come together: first, as the factual patterns in
particular cases move further away from those that generated our
bedrock intuitions, and second, as we develop more powerful
functional theories. The point here is not unfamiliar -intuitions
yield to protocols in many areas of life.
Custom
Let me now move on to the second area of discussion, that
of custom. There is little doubt that this particular element of the
Hayekian synthesis played a very powerful role in early thought.
The natural lawyers did not place all their eggs in a single basket
that defended natural reason. They also placed great stock in the
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idea that the rules of nature were of broad application so that they
17
could be found in virtually any society on the face of the globe.
The implication was that any rule that could survive in so many
different circumstances had to have tapped a sensitive nerve.
Survival, therefore, was a crude proxy for utility. It may not pick
the best of all rules to govern any situation, but it will certainly rule
out the worst. It is, moreover, for that reason that the customary
norm appealed to Hayek. It did not offer the false optimism that
perfect optimality is attainable in setting up social institutions. It
did, however, set up the more modest and defensible claim that its
decentralized tendencies, more often than not, lead toward some
form of efficient solution. The point here was that individuals who
did not understand the mechanisms of efficient market organization
could stand aside, and in many cases watch, as the right solution
unfolded before their eyes in specific contexts. That local excellence
managed to persist in relative isolation even when other sectors of
social life became highly dysfunctional. Custom was in effect an
invisible hand that shepherded organizations through their rough
spots.
There are, moreover, two particular contexts in which it
played a large role. One is in setting out (customary) property
rights. Here we cannot rely on ordinary two-party contracts because
all property relationships take place between a given individual
owner who has exclusive rights to possess, use, and dispose, and
the rest of the world, which is duty-bound to forbear from
interfering with these rights. Custom takes center stage because real
contracts fail because it is not possible for large numbers of
dispersed individuals to enter into voluntary contracts. Custom
thus becomes the loose surrogate for contract in which others
respect the rights of owners, and, by those nice hard-wired
instincts, have a better than even chance that others will respect

17 GAIUS, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, bk. I,

1 (Francis de Zulueta trans., 1946) (170)

("[Wihat natural reason establishes among all men and is observed by all peoples
alike, is called the Law of Nations, as being the law which all nations employ.").
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their rights as well. Once one person takes possession of a thing,
others tend to back off from challenging their supremacy.
Yet here too we have to be aware of the question of the justso story about the smooth evolution of customary norms. We need
to pay some attention to several difficulties with the great weight
we place on custom. The first is that frequently, discontinuous
changes with respect to the external environment make it
impossible to rely on any incremental system to achieve collective
well-being. That is in one sense the moral of Harold Demsetz's
account of the switch in property rights among the Indian tribes in
Quebec.1s The huge external demands required that the hunters
back off the first possession rule that was long sanctioned by
common practice, and adopt a system of territories in order to deal
with the problem of over-consumption. It is quite correct to think
that non-government groups can respond to these changes in at
least some circumstances. It is wrong to assume that they respond
to them by speeding up the process of incremental change. In most
cases, some coercive action by tribe or by state is needed to work
the shift. Whether we speak of the change in property regimes in
the Demsetz setting, or the highly divisive situation of the English
enclosure, it behooves us to remember that the transitions in
question are often bloody, and sometimes bloody-minded. And
most importantly, one byproduct of these transitions is massive
wealth shifts that provoke intense political outcry, precisely because
no one is able to either compute the needed side payments or secure
the political will to make the transfers. The role of custom in the
generation of property rights is important, but it is no panacea. At
some point, collective, purposive intervention has to take place. The
sharp increase in demand for beaver pelts, for example, led to a
centralized response to the common pool problem that the
increased demand created. The Hayekian model is displaced by
more systematic and centralized means, fraught with dangers as
they are.

18 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967).
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The same drift can be seen in the law of contract, which has
within it a strong customary base. In one sense, there is much to
commend about customs: if there is a standard way in which
traders do business, then it would be most unwise for an outsider to
decree that other transactional modes are better for the welfare of
the parties. The Hayekian point was that the outsider may not
understand how the insiders work; yet the insider might not be able
to explain his own conventions to the doubter who stands outside
the system. One role of custom in contract is that it asks courts and
other outsiders to defer to the explicit terms that insiders write into
contracts for use for their own businesses. It is also said that custom
is the preferred way to fill gaps within written contracts, which
allows the participants to save time in drafting and negotiating by
following these background norms. This last point is somewhat
trickier than the former, because it is always an open question
whether the gap-fillers that courts use are as uniform as a system of
customary law presupposes. But here the argument is quite simply
one of second best: there is no opposition to freedom of contract.
There is only an effort to make do until some explicit written term
emerges that obviates the need for the judicial inquiry. Customary
practices are weak, but they are better than nothing, and certainly
better than judicial efforts to construct from whole cloth a default
efficient set of arrangements.
Custom therefore can be used in two senses: it can refer to
the standard terms that are written into contracts or to the usual
background terms that govern in the absence of explicit terms. But
an appeal to custom in either of these two senses in discrete
transactions overstates its power in the area of its greatest strength:
commercial transactions. The most powerful evidence for this point
is that the economic role of contracts is not fully understood when
they are treated as dyadic arrangements that govern only the
relationships of the immediate parties to them. That understanding
will work for goods that are bought for consumption, but not for
goods that are purchased to be resold, or for the currency that is
used to purchase these goods, which is then reused by sellers when
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they enter the market as buyers. The entire system of trade depends
critically on the ability to string transactions in cash and goods
together, and this requires a degree of standardization to make
discrete transactions interoperable, to use the modern phrase. That
pressure toward standardization rears its head in both ancient and
modern times. The ancient law had a wide range of contracts (e.g.
mutuum) which presupposed a definition of fungible goods. 19 The
introduction of any system of weights and measures, of cash, or the
definition of a barrel or cartload requires some degree of
standardization, which is exceedingly hard to obtain by the
decentralized trial and error methods associated with custom.
These standardized devices moreover are not collusive or
anticompetitive. Rather, the ability to make efficient comparisons
facilitates both monopoly and competition by making both forms of
business more efficient than they would be in the absence of
standardization.
More generally, we know that the cycle of standardization
is much more complex than this Hayekian model presupposes.
Nothing is more common in emerging industries with rapid
technology change than to have individuals whose functions are to
establish, first, "best practices" for certain kinds of common tasks,
and, second, precise standards for communication between
machines whose interoperability is essential to technical advances.
The use of these institutions, which can create problems of their
own, is meant to both build on and displace the customary process.
The advantage of these standards organizations is that they are
often funded and organized outside the earshot of the government,
so the dominance of one single player is minimized.
Typically, such organizations favor a single open form of
architecture, so that the new standard is best understood as a
common highway to which all industry participants have equal
19 The contract of mutuum is a loan for consumption that obligates the buyer to
return the same type of good, without interest, that he borrowed. See GAIuS, supra
note 17, bk. III, 90 (defining "mutuum").
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access. There is in this context always the risk that individual
participants in these industry meetings will take advantage of this
collaborative process, for example, by steering the collective body
toward a standard that requires people to use their own
undisclosed patents. 20 Matters of this sort can precipitate major
lawsuits. But the key point here is not to determine how to resolve
the individual cases, but to note that the entire process of commerce
generates, by conscious design, these second-order organizations
that build the common platforms on which the primary activities
take place. Hayek was right to see that nongovernmental bodies
often take over and discharge standard-setting functions associated
with the state. But he was wrong to think that social drift is the
dominant force behind these forms of behavior. Conscious design
figures much more centrally into standard-setting than his account
would allow.
There is, moreover, good reason why in the end standardsetting has to take this form. Recall that the initial set of human
intuitions that were hard-wired stressed the importance of
reciprocity. That element remains central in understanding the role
of standard-setting organizations. But the intuition at most explains
why -merchants, either in isolation or in firms, participate on a
cooperative basis in these activities. But the intuition as to which
bus, port, or wire to use in some modern computer setting does not
come from nature. It comes from an intimate and detailed
knowledge within the field, knowledge that is attained only after
years of hands-on experience. So the older sources of information
give out, and more rational methods have to be used to supplement
and update what went before. Choosing the right people and the
right institutional frame will have a large role to play.
Protocols
There is next the question of what kinds of standards and
rules groups will adopt in particular institutional settings. And this
20 See Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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question leads me back to a theme that I have stressed for so many
years. The more complex the world, the simpler the rules needed
for it to operate successfully. The increased size of an economy
means people have to transact at low costs with strangers. The
uniquely tailored arrangements that are suitable for family
connections do not work in this context. People have to be able to
come together in much the same fashion as electrical outlets. There
is a standard form of connection, but the appliances that attach can
differ widely. The outsider looks at the connection, and the insider
adapts the functionality free from external complications.
Institutions therefore look very different on the ground
from the way in which lawyers think about difficult cases that make
it through the entire system for appellate resolution. The objective
of sound management in all lines of business is to make sure that
simple tasks are correctly discharged. These tasks are usually highly
repetitive, and they must be done correctly for the business to
function. Establishing the right protocols is critical for the work to
go forward: unless the simple tasks are regimented, the more
complex matters of design and judgment can never be addressed.
There are protocols for computers, for medicine, for improvisation,
credit-scoring, 21 and countless other areas. It is important in dealing
with these protocols to see how they relate to the basic intuitions
and customary rules that we have spoken of before. And they do
have both critical similarities and differences.
The similarity goes to the way in which information is
organized and presented. The word information literally means
data points of one kind or another put "in formation" so that

21

Credit Scoring, FTC Facts For Consumers: Focus on Credit (August 2005), available

at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/credit/scoring.pdf ("Credit scoring is
based on real data and statistics, so it usually is more reliable than subjective or
judgmental methods. It treats all applicants objectively. Judgmental methods
typically rely on criteria that are not systematically tested and can vary when applied
by different individuals."). For discussion, see Wendy Edelberg, Risk-based Pricing of
Interest Rates in Household Loan Markets (Dec. 5, 2003), availableat
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/200362/200362pap.pdf.

HeinOnline -- 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 18 2006-2007

Intuition, Custom and Protocol

2006]

patterns emerge that allow for their successful manipulation. The
intuitionist program has as one of its key elements the belief that
the amount of information that we have to collect from certain
situations consists of a smaller set of data points than we might
have thought. Protocols may be generated in a different fashion
from intuition, given the hard work involved. But they rely on the
same technique of paring down the information used in making
particular decisions. The point of Hayek and the modern blink
types is that too much information gets in the way of making sound
decisions, so we strip out many bits of relevant information, and, by
using less, we get more.
But the way in which that culling takes place differs
radically by context. Thus we know for example that little or no
instruction is needed to reinforce the norms of reciprocity and
nonaggression. The great risk is that people will migrate away from
these norms even after they have proven their value. But protocols
are the antithesis of intuition in the mode of their formation and in
the particular tasks that they address. They pick up where
intuitions drop off, and they only work when they are followed
slavishly. Protocols are the antithesis of discretion. Here are two
definitions of the term protocol, one from computers and one from
improvisation, which tell the same tale from the vantage points of
very different disciplines. The computer-based account reads:
An agreed-upon format for transmitting data between
two devices. The protocol determines the following:
"

the type of error checking to be used;

•

data compression method, if any;

*

how the sending device will indicate that it has
finished sending a message;

*

how the receiving device will indicate that it has
received a message.
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The commentary then continues: "There are a variety of
standard protocols from which programmers can choose. Each has
particular advantages and disadvantages; for example, some are
22
simpler than others, some are more reliable, and some are faster."
Note that protocols that are machine-based can tolerate a greater
level of complexity than those that are applied directly by human
beings, where simplicity earns a higher premium.
Here is what is said about improvisation:
Protocols - "long-established
codes"
determining
"precedence and precisely correct procedure"-may
seem antithetical to popular notions of improvised
creativity. Interdisciplinary research into improvisation
shows, however, that it typically occurs either within, or
in close relation to, voluntary constraints. Pressing, for
example, writes: "To achieve maximal fluency and
coherence, improvisers, when they are not performing
free (or 'absolute') improvisation, use a referent, a set of
cognitive, perceptual,
or
emotional
structures
(constraints) that guide and aid in the production of
musical materials." Attali writes extensively on the
"codes" found in the production of music: "rules of
arrangement and laws of succession" which provide
"precise operationality" 23
The critical point is that protocols and intuitions are
generated by wholly different processes. Malcolm Gladwell's Blink
presents an instructive example. 24 Gladwell describes the heroic
efforts of Brendan Reilly of Cook County Hospital to implement
22 Webopedia, What Is a Protocol?, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/P/protocol.htnl
(last visited Oct. 24, 2005). Note the accurate description of the trade-off between
simplicity and reliability on the one hand, and sophistication and error on the other.
The empirical observation is that there is no dominant solution to these questions,
but that the presumption should be set in favor of simplicity and reliability.
23 Marshall Soules, Improvising Character Jazz, the Actor, and the Protocols of
Improvisation, http://www.mala.bc.ca/-soules/shepard/character.htm. (last visited
Oct. 24, 2005).
24 GLADWELL, supra note 6, at 125.
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some simple protocols that Dr. Lee Goldman had developed for
physicians to sort cases of potential coronary disease. The recounted
story is, however, the antithesis of the Blink thesis that it is
supposed to support. The difficulty in this particular area is that
intuitions, even those that experienced physicians hone over years
of practice, just do not do a very good job in sorting out the cases.
The doctors involved made all sorts of leaps and relied on all sorts
of hunches to make their choices. Goldblum and Reilly relied on a
triage method developed only after "hundreds of cases" were fed
into a computer, which led to a three-part algorithm that asked
whether the pain felt by the patient counted as unstable angina,
whether there was fluid in the patient's lungs, and whether the
patient's systolic blood pressure was below 100. Ignore everything
else, and just stick to the protocol, which was designed to eliminate
intuitive judgments. Here was a case of not thinking, period.
Empirical tests showed that Goldblum's algorithm triumphed
"hands down" over the intuitions that it displaced. It did better in
reducing false positives by not holding for special treatment
patients who were not having a heart attack. It also excelled in
predicting those who have heart attacks with an accuracy rate of 95
percent, as opposed to 75 to 89 percent by the old methods. That
improvement is impressive in its own right, but it is all the more
astounding when one considers that the doctors were able to
achieve their high percentages under the intuitive method by
heavily over-admitting patients. It is a matter of total dominance
when one decision procedure simultaneously reduces both forms of
error.
The emergence of this successful protocol supports the
Hayekian view that a few simple factors are dispositive in complex
situations. Simultaneously, it casts doubts on the ability of
intuitions to work in difficult and complicated situations. The work
to get the right three steps took years to accomplish, but the number
of lives saved is very large. We need simple rules for a complex
world, but we have to be sure that these rules are applied in
discrete settings and that we have our attention fastened onto the

HeinOnline -- 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 21 2006-2007

NYU Journal of Law & Liberty

[Vol. 2:1

right simple rules. Rules of thumb that work well at sea may not
work well on land.
Legal Implications
The previous discussion of protocols did not deal with legal
situations, where the usefulness of simple rules is always
challenged by the need to successively refine the outcomes that
these rules generate. It is therefore not appropriate to conclude that
all legal rules, regardless of context, can be as simple as intuitions
and protocols. But simplicity should often be preferred nonetheless,
although practice usually runs the other way. Here the most
obvious area in which to see the difficulty is the legal rules that
purport to regulate the transmission of information by penalizing
those who do not supply what is required. We have a broad law of
misrepresentation and add to it a set of complex obligations for
disclosure. These embrace a number of areas, of which it is useful to
mention a few here: the duty to warn in product liability cases,
duty to disclose in security cases, and duty to disclose in informed
consent situations. The older law on this question was quite
minimalist on required disclosures, and usually put some portion of
the burden on the recipient of the information to make further
inquiries if more information were required. But one tendency in
modern law is to permit the compilation of long lists of material
information, and then to consider presumptions that could be
introduced to help the plaintiff over the hump of deciding whether
the particular information that was not supplied would have made
some difference in the plaintiff's choices. This view treats the
information that is missing as more important than the large
amounts of information that is available from all sources.
One case that merits some particular attention was the
open-and-obvious rule, which held that, for example, machine tools
that did not have guards may be dangerous but that disclosure
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rather than redesign or extensive warnings was sufficient. 25 The
repudiation of that rule, which imposed a hard stop on liability in
many cases, was paired with an understanding (which still holds
today) that stringent liability is prima facie proper when concealed
defects result in harm. The older open-and-obvious rule strongly
applied to any situation where there was asymmetrical information;
that is, the seller knew of some condition but the buyer did not. But
most product cases do not involve intentional concealment, so here
the strong liability for latent defects was justified on the ground that
the seller had better ways to prevent or correct these. Yet the
general protection against liability for open and obvious conditions
allowed for a greater range of goods to be sold, some of which
could in turn be subject to downstream adaptations by users, or in
workplace settings, by their employers. It in effect put the decision
on the party best able to prevent the harm in question. And it did
not create any real incentive to corrupt the original manufacturing
process, because the higher risk, if any, is known and will reduce
the willingness to purchase.
The next generation of criticism questioned the belief that
information transmission was the sole goal and argued that design
changes should be imperative when warnings did not suffice.
Harper and James, in a very influential passage, wrote shortly after
Campo:
The bottom does not logically drop out of a negligence
case against the maker when it is shown that the
purchaser knew of the dangerous condition. Thus if the
25 See, e.g., Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802,804 (N.Y. 1950) ("Ifa manufacturer does
everything necessary to make the machine function properly for the purpose for
which it is designed, if the machine is without any latent defect, and if its functioning
creates no danger or peril that is not known to the. user, then the manufacturer has
satisfied the law's demands. We have not yet reached the state where a manufacturer
is under the duty of making a machine accident proof or foolproof. Just as the
manufacturer is under no obligation, in order to guard against injury resulting from
deterioration, to furnish a machine that will not wear out, so he is under no duty to
guard against injury from a patent peril or from a source manifestly dangerous.")
(citation omitted).
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product is a carrot-topping machine with exposed
moving parts, or an electric clothes wringer dangerous to
the limbs of the operator, and if it would be feasible for
the maker of the product to install a guard or safety
release, it should be a question for the jury whether
reasonable care demanded such a precaution, though its
absence is obvious. Surely reasonable men might find
here a great danger, even to one who knew the condition
and since it was so readily avoidable they might find the
6
maker negligent.2

This argument influenced the New York Court of Appeals
27
twenty-five years after Campo to jettison the open and obvious rule
in a decision that states the now-dominant position found in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: "The fact that a danger is open and
obvious is relevant to the issue of defectiveness, but does not
necessarily preclude a plaintiff from establishing that a reasonable
alternative design should have been adopted that would have
reduced or prevented injury to the plaintiff." 28
Note here the new levels of complexity introduced into the
situation which allow wiggle room, albeit less under the
Restatement than under John Wade's well-known formulation that
made liability turn on a long list of factors. 29 Now one has to ask
26 2 FOWLER HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 28.5 (1956).

27 Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577 (1976) ("Apace with advanced

technology, a relaxation of the Campo stringency is advisable. A casting of increased
responsibility upon the manufacturer, who stands in a superior position to recognize
and cure defects, for improper conduct in the placement of finished products into the
channels of commerce furthers the public interest.").
28
RESTATEMENT (TI-RD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmt. d (1998).
29 John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825,

837-38 (1973) ("If there is agreement that the determination of whether a product is
unreasonably dangerous, or is not duly safe, involves the necessary application of a
standard, it will, like the determination of negligence or of strict liability for an
abnormally dangerous activity, require the consideration and weighing of a number
of factors. I offer here a revised list of factors which seem to me to be of significance
in applying the standard:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product - its utility to
the user and to the public as a whole.
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about feasibility, which in turn requires a calculation of costs and
benefits. Yet no awareness is shown that the same piece of
equipment might be used in different ways for different jobs (as is
common with many machine tools), so that customization at the
buyer level will trade off safety and efficiency better than any onesize-fits-all solution that a manufacturer could design into the
product before sale. Moreover, if the original manufacturer is the
cheaper installer, then he could offer the original buyer a set of
options, with downstream selection, wholly without legal
intervention. Yet, once the new standard is in place, then the list of
factors is essentially unbounded on either side. This is best captured
by the complex formula offered in the Wade risk/utility test, which
has exerted immense influence over judicial decisions, but its main
consequence is to sharply limit the number of cases where a
defendant can obtain summary judgment. The reliability and
complexity tradeoffs that are apparent to designers of computer
protocols are lost on judges, who see only one half of the problem at
most. Yet in the end, the Wade position cannot be sustained because
of the utter lack of guidance that it gives in any situation where
there are countless permutations of the safety/effectiveness
30
tradeoff.

(2) The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that it will
cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet
the same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character
of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too
expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in
the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in
the product and their availability, because of general public
knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the
existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading
the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability
insurance.") (citations omitted).
30 For my criticism, see Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIo ST. L.J.
469 (1987).
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Hence, there is in many cases a creep back towards the
older position in which the question of obviousness tends to loom
quite large in the decision, even in courts that think it sensible to
then ask the defendant to explain why leaving the obvious choice
was the best design decision.31 There is a huge reluctance to treat
the decisions as something to be made privately, once the
information transfer has been completed. The legal evolution on
this question is marked by a collective failure of nerve, which
hardly shows the inexorable movement of common law judges to
ever more efficient liability rules. The hard open and obvious rule
will make mistakes in some cases. The more fluid rules of
reasonableness carry with them the illusion that all these errors can
be avoided. There is, moreover, no question that if the subtler
risk/utility analysis were flawlessly performed it would replicate
the open and obvious test in many cases, and deviate from it in at
most a few. But in real-world settings, reliability in the broad run of
cases counts for far more than some hypothetical ability of a heavily
nuanced rule to get all the cases right -a postulate that it is easy to
state in theory but hard to generate in fact. Quite simply, we are
better off with a simple rule that gets 90 percent of the cases right
than with a more complex rule that aspires to get 100 percent of
them right only to miss on more than 10 percent. There is no reason
to favor expensive rules that yield weak results. I have no doubt
that the logic of protocols works to support the traditional rule over
its modern alternative.
The more general proposition that follows from this
illustration is that the usual sophisticated modern rules in all areas
of life tend to do badly over the broad run of cases relative to
simpler and sensible rules. The literature on intuition, custom, and
protocol is not meant to say that social cost/benefit calculations are
illegitimate. It is only meant to say that the indirect utilitarian
approach trumps the more conscious effort at multi-factor decisionmaking, whether by courts or administrative agencies. Hayek did

31 Linegar v. Armour of America, Inc., 909 F.2d 1150 (8th Cir. 1990).
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not coin the phrase "simple rules for a complex world," but his own
thought, suitably refined, was one of the key factors that led me in
that direction. We must always be aware of the limitations of
intuitions, customs, and protocols. But by the same token, we
should never lose sight of the huge benefits that they provide.
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